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ABSTRACT 
The lack of quality education many charter schools 
ofer disproportionately and adversely impacts 
communities of color. This article considered two 
models of charter school governance in use by 
California and Ohio. The frst model posits that a 
fundamental tenet of charter schools is freedom 
from the burdensome bureaucracy traditional 
public schools bear. Based on the argument that 
deregulation enables charter schools to employ 
more innovative instructional and management 
practices, it assumes higher achievement scores 
would follow. The second model proposes to 
address educational inequality by increasing 
accountability on charter school authorizers by 
increasing regulatory practices. These models 
example the variety of governance models extant. 
In addition, arguments supporting each model are 
presented. The authors conclude with a discussion 
that supports the position that while autonomy 
is essential to maintaining the original objectives 
of charter schools, states must hold authorizers 
accountable for student achievement. 
Charter schools are independently-run schools
that receive state and federal funding, and operate
under contracts with authorizing entities known 
as authorizers, sponsors, or chartering agencies.
These terms are used synonymously. Authorizers are 
organizations which:  
Can start a new charter school, set 
expectations and oversee school 
performance, and decide which schools
should continue to serve students or not.
Depending on state law, authorizers can
Authorizers in California Authorizers in Ohio 
•  Traditional public school districts •  Traditional public school districts 
• County School Boards •  Not-for-proft organizations 
• California Department of •  Education Service Centers 
Education • Universities 
• Ohio Department of Education, 
Ofce of School Sponsorship 
Table 1. Authorizing organizations permitted in California and Ohio. 
be school districts, education agencies, 
independent boards, universities, mayors
and municipalities, and not-for-profts (About 
National Association of Charter School 
Authorizers, n.d.). 
Given the critical role that charter school 
authorizers have in school choice reform, they 
should be central to the discussion of charter school 
performance and accountability. Unfortunately,
charter school policy continues to present issues 
in governance (e.g. balancing autonomy with
accountability) as authorizers are often excluded 
from the conversation. These governance issues are
disturbing considering how they disproportionately
impact students, parents, and communities of color 
who comprise nearly half of the nation’s charter 
school enrollments. As education reform rhetoric
continues to shift from school-level improvements
to system-wide change (Daly & Finnigan, 2016), the 
conversation must include how policymakers will 
provide responsible governance of charter schools
and the entities that authorize them. To establish 
high-quality school options, policymakers must 
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Beard Charter School Authorization 
expand the parameters of responsibility (Allen & 
Mintrom, 2010) and require more oversight for charter 
school authorization. 
This article focuses on California and Ohio 
authorization policy. Although the fve states with 
the largest population of charter school students
by percentage are Arizona, Colorado, Michigan, 
Louisiana, and Florida (U.S. Department of Education,
2016), the authors chose Ohio and California were 
chosen to review in this analysis for two reasons: 
these states educate large student populations of 
color, and they employ two contrasting models of 
authorizer governance. The models are presented as
examples of the diferences that exist in authorizer 
oversight that parents should be aware of when 
choosing charter schools. These two models are 
presented for policymakers to consider, especially
those from states with similar student populations. 
Student enrollment data (2014-2015) from 
California refected that African American students 
made up 6% of the total public school enrollment1. 
African American students represent 9% of 
California’s charter school enrollment. This was
second only to the Latinx student population. Latinx 
students made up 54% of the total public school 
enrollment, and 49% of the charter school population 
(National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, 2015). 
Ohio’s student enrollment data (2014-2015) 
refected that African American students made up 
16% of public school total enrollment. However, 
this subgroup occupies 46% of charter school seats, 
making African Americans the largest subgroup in
Ohio charter schools. Ohio’s Latinx public school 
student enrollment is 5%. Latinx students occupy 
7% of charter school seats (Ohio Department of 
Education, 2017; National Alliance for Public Charter 
Schools, 2015).
The 2015-2016 data refect that the African 
American student population percentage for
California charters decreased by 0.5%, while the 
Latinx student percentage increased by 1.3%. In Ohio 
the African American percentage decreased by 0.6%, 
and the Latinx percentage increased by 0.3%. This 
may suggest that more Latinx parents are increasingly
choosing charter schools as a viable option for the 
education of their children. 
According to the 2014-2015 data, African 
American and Latinx students combined represent
half of all students served by charter schools in Ohio 
(52.5%) and California (57.6%). The 2015-2016 data 
refected a slight decrease in Ohio (to 52.2%) and a 
slight increase in California (to 58.4%). 
The National Education Association (2017) policy 
stated:
Charters have grown the most in school 
districts that were already struggling to 
meet students’ needs due to longstanding, 
systemic and ingrained patterns of 
institutional neglect, racial and ethnic 
segregation, inequitable school funding, and 
disparities in staf, programs and services. 
The result has been the creation of separate, 
largely unaccountable, privately managed
charter school systems in those districts that 
undermine support and funding of local
public schools. Such separate and unequal 
education systems are disproportionately
located in, and harm, students and 
communities of color by depriving both of 
the high quality public education system that 
should be their right. (National Education 
Association policy statement, 2017). 
The resulting failure or success of charter schools 
presents either a detrimental or benefcial
educational quality to these vulnerable and 
traditionally underserved student populations. 







California African American 6% 8.8% 5.8% 8.3% 
California Latinx 53.6% 48.8% 54% 50.1% 
Ohio African American 16.4% 45.7% 16.5% 45.1% 
Ohio Latinx 4.8% 6.8% 5.04% 7.1% 
Table 2. Enrollment percentage by race and school type for California and Ohio. 
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Beard Charter School Authorization 
Lipman (2011) argued that working class African 
American and Latinx communities are inordinately
destabilized by poor schooling and resulting closure 
of failing schools. She believed, “the disinvestment 
in schools is integral to disinvestment in African 
American and Latino/a neighborhoods” (p. 52). In 
states with large populations of African American 
and Latinx students attending charter schools
such as Ohio and California, charter school policy 
is African American and Latinx education policy. 
By analyzing the governance mechanisms of both
states and putting forth recommendations for
state departments of education, it is our hope 
that policymakers across the country realize the 
possibilities of implementing school choice policies 
and governance structures toward stabilizing and
enriching communities of color. 
Finnigan (2007) theorized that the charter school 
concept is based on a trade-of or exchange of greater 
autonomy for increased results-based accountability. 
In this trade-of, state departments of education give 
charter schools public funds and increased autonomy 
in exchange for student academic achievement. 
A study by the Center for Research on Education 
Outcomes (2014) found that Ohio charter school 
students had such poor academic achievement scores 
that it was the equivalent of completing 43 fewer 
days of learning in math and 14 fewer days of learning 
in reading when compared to similarly situated 
peers in traditional public schools. The same data 
source refected that California students refected a 
defciency of 14 days of learning in math but refected 
gains in reading equivalent to 14 additional days of 
learning. These variances in academic achievement 
place students of color attending charter schools in 
precarious situations. 
Further complicating these issues and central 
to this argument is the poor performance of the 
authorizing entities that oversee charter schools. 
Ohio has a new and robust authorizer evaluation 
system; therefore, Ohio data were used to illustrate 
this point. On a recent round of authorizer evaluations 
(October 2016), 21 of Ohio’s 65 authorizers received 
a rating of ‘poor’, putting them at risk for immediate 
shutdown. Thirty-nine authorizers were rated
‘inefective’, including the authorizer housed within
the Ohio Department of Education (ODE), while only 
fve authorizers received a rating of ‘efective’. Not 
one authorizer received the department’s top rank of
‘exemplary’. If we accept charter schools as a trade-
of or exchange as Finnigan suggested, whereby 
charter schools receive public funding in return for 
adequately educated students, the data reveal that 
the public is getting the short end of the deal. 
Literature Review 
Although the body of research on charter schools 
is extensive, the literature pertaining to charter 
school authorizers is limited (Anderson & Finnigan, 
2001; Hassel & Vergari, 1999; Henry & Dixson, 2016; 
Palmer & Gau, 2005). This article seeks to add to the 
scant literature on charter school authorizers while 
informing parents and communities of color of the 
educational responsibility owed to their children.
Palmer and Gau (2005) recognized the signifcance of 
leadership and the critical responsibility of authorizers 
in creating efective charter schools. Said another 
way, the success or failure of a charter is a function 
of the quality of its authorizer. They stated, “the role 
of authorizer…is pivotal to the overall success of 
the charter movement. Yet surprisingly little is really 
understood about authorizers. They have rarely
been scrutinized closely or evaluated” (p. 352). The 
following section outlines other recurring themes
the literature provides relevant to charter school 
authorizers. 
Authorizers as Gatekeepers of School Choice 
Authorizers are the frst defense, or “gatekeeping
mechanism” (Henry & Dixson, 2016, p. 220) in keeping 
inefective schools from opening (or staying open)
and allowing excellent schools to thrive and replicate. 
Ruble and Harris (2014) described the application 
process as the frst screening tool in building high-
quality schools, as authorizers use applications 
to “control entry” (p. 369) into the system and 
deem only those worthy to open schools. Bulkley 
(2001) defned the application, in part, as a “quality 
control mechanism” (p. 14) to assist authorizers in 
determining which applicants are most likely to be 
successful. Vergari (2001) concurred, writing that 
granting a charter to an applicant “is arguably the
most important decision to be made by the charter 
school authorizer” (p. 134). The author further stated 
that when an authorizer permits a school to open, 
it signals to the public that the school is “likely to 
succeed” (p. 134). Vergari further concluded that 
failing charter schools are due, in part, to the poor 
judgment of authorizers.
Authorizer Accountability Practices 
The importance of full-scale accountability measures 
for authorizers have been determined. Palmer
(2007) understood that the creation of value-added 
accountability systems would allow researchers 
to make better determinations of the relationship 
between authorizer quality and charter school 
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Beard Charter School Authorization 
performance. Zimmer, Gill, Attridge, and Obenauf
(2014) argued that policymakers should determine 
a method for how authorizers oversee and support
their schools. Vergari (2001) recognized the 
paradoxical nature of charter school and authorizer 
regulation stating, “charter school authorizers are 
shaping the regulatory boundaries of a policy reform 
based on deregulation” (p. 138). Similarly, Palmer
and Gau (2005) discovered through interviews that 
authorizers struggle to balance the fexibility required 
of charter schools with the top-down administrative 
burdens of maintaining accountability.
As a means of checks and balances, Bulkley 
(2001) theorized that one method to increase 
accountability is to remove the renewal authority 
from charter school authorizers and place that 
responsibility with an external party. Doing so would 
remove “political disincentives” (p. 16) for keeping 
poorly performing schools open. Authorizer hopping
is when charter school operators move from one 
authorizer to another to avoid being shut down for 
poor performance. The scenario is usually a variation 
of the following: 
An authorizer signals to a failing school their 
plans to revoke or not renew the school’s 
charter contract; the school seeks out a new 
authorizer who agrees to keep the school 
open; and the failing school, which was 
identifed for closure, avoids accountability 
and remains open...Authorizer hopping
represents the breakdown of charter school 
accountability (Doyle, 2014, p. 1). 
To be sure to mitigate political incentivization, the 
external party review should be blind, eliminating the 
possibility of authorizer hopping.
The Relationship Between Authorizer Type 
and Student Achievement 
Several researchers questioned if authorizer type
(i.e. a state board of education, non-proft, school 
board) could predict student achievement. Zimmer 
et al. (2014) found that students attending Ohio 
charter schools originally authorized by non-proft
authorizers had, on average, lower gains in math and 
reading than their similarly situated peers attending
charter schools authorized by other entities. 
Conversely, Gleason, Clark, Tuttle, and Dwoyer 
(2010) found “no statistically signifcant relationship 
between impacts on Year 2 reading or mathematics 
scores and type of authorizer” (p. 95). Notably, they 
also found that variations in achievement scores 
within authorizer type was high. This indicated the 
need for authorizers to share best practices between 
and within authorizer types. Carlson, Lavery, and 
Witte (2012) argued for more rigorous studies to 
measure the relationship between authorizing type 
and mean levels of achievement so that drawing 
conclusions might occur from causal evidence (rather
than correlational). 
Authorizer Motivation 
Motivation to authorize matters. Cowen, Fleming, and 
Gofen (2008) argued that motivation has “important 
implications” (p. 128) in accounting for the diferences 
in achievement between charter schools. Ruble and 
Harris (2014) discussed how authorizers balance 
the competing goals of student achievement and 
other factors in authorization. For many authorizers,
parent satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) and local 
political processes distorted the decision-making 
process causing authorizers to make choices based 
on factors other than student achievement. Zimmer 
et al. (2014) stated, “these [authorizer] fees may 
encourage the authorization of charter schools but
create little incentive to scrutinize charter applications 
or performance of schools” (p. 62). They recognized 
the source of authorizer funding (often a percentage
of the schools’ per-pupil funding) potentially creates 
perverse incentives to sponsor new schools.
Authorizing Schools 
Charter school authorization falls under various
entities, including non-proft organizations, school
districts, universities, and educational service centers. 
The literature, however, focused on the performance 
and challenges faced by non-proft and district 
authorizers. The decision was made for this study 
to focus on non-proft and district authorizers as 
supported by the literature. In this section, both 
non-proft authorizer performance and the specifc
challenges of district-based authorizing are described.
Non-proft authorizers. 
Only two states, Minnesota and Ohio, have active 
non-proft organizations authorizing schools (Carlson
et al, 2012; Zimmer et al., 2014). While the practice is 
not common across the country, it is nevertheless 
addressed in several articles. Hassel, Ziebarth, and 
Steiner (2005) suggested that a non-proft’s possible 
connection to a community, commitment to a 
vision, and “credibility and visibility” (p. 10) within a 
particular population may make it an ideal candidate
to be an authorizer. As previously noted, Carlson et al. 
(2012) found that schools authorized by non-profts 
had more variances in student achievement than 
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Beard Charter School Authorization 
other schools, while Zimmer et al. (2014) found that 
schools authorized by nonprofts had, on average, 
lower achievement in math and reading. While this 
preliminary research is inconclusive, it points to the 
need to closely monitor authorizer type in relation to 
achievement.
District authorizers. 
The question if districts should be given the power 
to authorize new schools was frequently addressed 
in the literature. Conficting interests, lack of desire 
to open charter schools, political pressure, and 
overburdened systems were all cited as reasons 
why districts may not be a good ft as charter school 
authorizers. Ruble and Harris (2014) found that New 
Orleans district schools were less likely to authorize 
charter schools because they were “disinclined to
create competition for themselves through charter 
schools over which they have less control” (p. 365). 
Palmer (2007) believed “the best authorizers are 
those that actually desire the responsibility” (p. 305), 
which suggests that only organizations with the 
desire to authorize should do so, as long as they are 
able to demonstrate their capacity and potential for 
efectiveness.
Vergari (2001) observed that it was unusual for 
school districts to eagerly authorize charter schools: 
Administrators of the traditional public
school system frequently view charter 
schools as a distraction for other reform 
initiatives and as an unreasonable burden
on school district budgets and personnel.
School districts may also place implicit or 
explicit conditions on charter approval that 
are unappealing to charter school applicants.
Thus, charter school advocates favor 
permitting an entity other than the school 
district to authorize charter schools (p. 132). 
Palmer and Gau (2005) reiterated Vergari’s fndings, 
stating, “local school boards, on the whole, do not 
make the best charter school authorizers. They are 
often hampered by the infuence of charter-averse 
education interest groups and local politics” (p. 354). 
Additionally, the authors wrote, local boards often 
do not have the necessary infrastructure to support 
additional schools in their districts. 
The NEA (2017) proposed two safeguards for 
district charter authorization. The frst states that 
a school district should authorize a charter school 
only if the charter is necessary to meet the needs 
of students and will meet the needs in a manner 
that improves the local public school system. The 
second proposes public charter schools should only
be authorized by the same entity that oversees all 
district schools, such as a locally elected school board 
or a community-based authorizer to maintain local 
democratic control (National Education Association, 
2017). 
As highlighted in the literature, research reveals 
the challenges authorizers face. Many of the issues 
revolve around regulation, governance, and student
achievement of the schools under their purview. 
The literature examined the difculty in drawing 
causal relationships in authorizer-charter school
research (Carlson et al., 2012; Ruble & Harris, 2014). 
The literature also advocated for alternative pathways 
to increase access to quality authorizing (Palmer, 
2007). More recently, authors describe the benefts 
of diversity in authorizer type and the insufcient 
infrastructure available to authorizers in holding
charter schools accountable for student achievement 
(Carlson et al., 2012; Palmer & Gau, 2005, Ruble & 
Harris, 2014).
 Two Models of Authorizer Governance 
The creation of charter schools and the agencies 
that oversee them initially began as a new form of 
accountability in public school education. Rather 
than impede these schools with the burdensome 
bureaucracy known in traditional school districts, 
charter schools were to be free to innovate. In 
exchange for public funds, these schools were to 
provide a high-quality education to the state’s 
children. That was meant to be the extent of 
accountability; to show that students were learning 
to a satisfactory level and they would be granted 
autonomy in designing an education plan for 
students (Anderson & Finnigan, 2001; Hassel & Vergari, 
1999). This “radically diferent approach to education” 
(DeMaria, Ramsey, & Bodary, 2015, p. 3) was free of 
regulation in its very design. However, the variation in 
oversight and the uneven academic performance of 
students of color warrant authorizer policy reform. 
Two contrasting models of authorizer
bureaucratic oversight from the states of California 
and Ohio are ofered for the purpose of exampling 
the variety that exists in and among authorizer 
governance. The frst model advocates that decreased 
regulation, with strict accountability measures, best 
refects the true aim of charter school policy as it 
frees authorizers from bureaucratic burden. The
second model argues for increased regulation and
oversight from the state department of education to 
hold authorizers accountable for managing efective
charter schools. 
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Beard Charter School Authorization 
Model I: Decrease Regulation, Increase 
Accountability 
Advocates for charter school deregulation argue that 
policymakers must increase autonomy for charter 
school authorizers to create space for innovative 
practices frst promised with the conception of 
charter schools. They argue, schools would have the 
“potential to unleash creativity and innovation...the 
fexibility that deregulation provides can help districts 
and schools lift student outcomes” (DeMaria, Ramsey, 
& Bodary, 2015, p. 4). Rewarding accountability with 
autonomy is not new in educational leadership. 
District ofcials often reward schools with less 
oversight when they demonstrate efective 
achievement gains, giving “schools autonomy based 
on where they are in their success story” (Beard, 2015, 
p. 21). The Thomas B. Fordham Foundation, one of 
only fve authorizers to receive an efective rating in 
2016 in Ohio, calls this “the accountability/autonomy 
promise” (Palmer, Terrell, Hassel, & Svahn, 2006, p.3). 
In a policy guide for Ohio legislators, the Foundation 
stated: 
Ohio’s charter schools are subject to 
constraining and sometimes conficting laws 
and regulations. As it moves to live up to the 
accountability side of the bargain, Ohio must 
act as well to ensure that charter schools 
have the freedom to be diferent in ways that 
beneft their students (Palmer et al., 2006, p. 16). 
In exchange for this deregulation, proponents 
argue, authorizers use fexibility and experimentation 
within schools to design better ways of addressing 
the needs of the state’s most challenging student 
populations. States can monitor academic 
growth by enacting “rigorous standards and strict 
accountability” (DeMaria et al., 2015, p. 22). Model I 
advocates argue that decreased regulation is critical 
(Finnigan, 2007) if charter schools wish to maintain a 
separate and distinct identity from their traditional 
public school counterparts. 
Model I highlighted. 
California serves as a current example of Model I 
governance. As the state with the largest charter 
school market in the nation, it also has the largest 
number of charter school authorizers. However, 
as highlighted in a recent policy report by NACSA 
(2016), there is no state law that requires California 
authorizers to be evaluated, nor are there required 
sanctions for those who do not meet state 
requirements for authorizing. While authorizers may 
close schools with low student performance scores, 
there are no laws in place for the required closing of 
poorly performing or failing authorizers. Additionally,
California law does not require standards-based
authorizer evaluation or stipulate authorizer sanctions
in cases of poor school performance (NACSA, 2016). 
In sum, California serves a Model I example as 
authorizers receive little guidance from state law 
and are, for the most part, left alone in overseeing 
charter schools. In return, authorizers are expected 
to maintain a strong portfolio of charter schools that 
meet established student performance benchmarks. 
A brief history of charter schools in California. 
In 1992, California became the second state 
in the United States to enact charter school law. A 
conversation on school vouchers and school choice
was emerging, described by a California lawmaker as 
a “full-blown efort to reconstitute public education 
in California” (Hart & Burr, 1996). Early proponents 
of the charter law imagined charter schools in 
California to be a middle ground between the status 
quo of traditional districts and total decentralization
of public education. Charters would retain local 
control while permitting families and communities 
a greater variety of educational opportunities for 
their students. The bill also ensured that schools 
and authorizers would still be held accountable for 
student learning. The drafters of the original charter 
bill wrote, “in exchange for their unprecedented
freedom of action, charter schools clearly carry a 
responsibility to be accountable to the public” (Hart 
& Burr, 1996, p. 40). Senate Bill 1448 was passed in 
1992, authorizing the creation of charter schools in 
California and frmly establishing charter schools
as another option in public education. California’s 
charter school population has increased steadily since 
the passing of its charter law (see Figure 1). 
Authorizer governance was not introduced or
detailed until 2003. Assembly Bill 1137, Reyes, outlined 
specifc authorizer oversight duties, including annual 
school visits and compliance monitoring with state 
reporting requirements. The law reads as follows: 
Each chartering authority, in addition to any 
other duties imposed by this part, shall do all 
of the following with respect to each charter 
school under its authority: (a) Identify at least 
one staf member as a contact person for the 
charter school; (b) Visit each charter school 
at least annually; (c) Ensure that each charter 
school under its authority complies with all 
reports required of charter schools by law; (d) 
Monitor the fscal condition of each charter 
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school under its authority; (e) Provide timely
notifcation to the department if any of the 
following circumstances occur or will occur
with regard to a charter school for which it is 
the chartering authority: (1) A renewal of the 
charter is granted or denied, (2) The charter 
is revoked, (3) The charter school will cease 
operation for any reason (California Chapter
892, Section 8, Section 47604.32). 
Figure 1. California charter school enrollment by year. Dark blue 
represents state reported data sources, light blue represents Common 
Core of Data source. National Alliance for Public Charter Schools. (2015). 
Public charter school’s dashboard. 
Retrieved from http://www.publiccharters.org/dashboard/home 
Additionally, the bill required that a charter school 
meet at least one of several academic performance 
criteria as a prerequisite to receiving a charter 
renewal. 
Model II: Increase Regulation, Increase 
Accountability 
The second model of charter school governance 
difers from Model I in that it advocates for strong 
regulation and oversight of authorizing bodies. This 
model increases oversight using regulatory practices 
along with fnancial incentives and disincentives 
(Kane & Staiger, 2002). Model II difers from Model 
I governance because it calls for more supervision 
of authorizers. It also difers from Model I in that it 
has built-in levers for sanctioning poorly performing 
authorizers. Additionally, Model II ofers higher 
authorization caps giving them the right to authorize 
more schools. It also provides access to more funding 
which serves as rewards for authorizers who perform 
well. 
Model II highlighted. 
Ohio serves as a current example of Model II 
governance. Through strategic policymaking and 
increased regulatory statutes, the state has increased 
the efciency of its authorizing sector. The changes 
made included requiring all authorizers to function
under the management of the Ohio Department of 
Education (ODE), mandating that ODE provide annual 
feedback to authorizers, and requiring annual reports
from ODE on authorizer performance. Pushing the
weakest authorizers out of system decreased the 
number of authorizers in the state. The following 
section outlines the development of Ohio charter 
school authorizer policy to provide perspective on
the accountability policy progression. While the 
policies have been developed, implementation 
remains inconsistent.
A brief history of charter schools in Ohio. 
A 1997 response to a judicial ruling mandated that 
Ohio spend more money on education. As a result, 
the Ohio legislature enacted the state’s frst charter 
school law (Community School Legislative History, 
2016). At the time Republican lawmakers believed that 
opening charter schools would serve as a cheaper,
more efective option than opening more traditional 
public schools (Urycki, 2015). In 1999 legislators 
determined that 21 more urban school districts 
as well as districts determined to be in academic 
emergency could be permitted to open charter
schools as an option for their students. Thus, from 
1999 to 2007 Ohio’s charter schools experienced a 
period of rampant growth (see Figure 2). The Ohio 
Department of Education, however, was unable to 
maintain regulation of new charters as it lacked the 
capacity to manage the increasing volume of charter 
schools in its portfolio. The lack of regulation and 
accountability in Ohio law created fertile ground 
for school choice advocates and educational 
entrepreneurs. 
Figure 2. Ohio charter school enrollment by year. Dark blue represents 
state reported data sources, light blue represents Common Core of Data 
source. National Alliance for Public Charter Schools. (2015). Public charter 
school’s dashboard.
Retrieved from http://www.publiccharters.org/dashboard/home 
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Beard Charter School Authorization 
The demand created from the increased number 
of charter schools prompted policymakers to change 
ODE’s role to make it an authorizer of authorizers 
(Community School Legislative History, 2016). In this 
new capacity, ODE refocused its eforts to approve 
entities to become authorizers, provide technical 
assistance to authorizers, and monitor and evaluate 
the efectiveness of authorizer oversight (Ohio 
Revised Code 3314.015). House Bill 364 stated that 
ODE would only sponsor schools in critical need, 
shifting the burden of managing operations to
authorizing agents outside of ODE.
House Bill 2 (The Ohio State Legislature, 2015) 
was passed in December 2015 and established a 
new structure for evaluating sponsors and holding
them accountable for public funds. Up until this time, 
there was no legislation guiding outcome-based
accountability for authorizers. The bill ushered in a 
wave of reforms in authorizer regulation: ODE was 
now required by law to annually rate all authorizers, 
incentives and consequences based on authorizer
evaluations were detailed, authorizers were required
to keep a record of fnancial responsibility, and fnally, 
they were prohibited from selling additional goods or 
services to any school they authorized (Ohio Revised 
Code, 3314.46). This was designed as a deterrent 
for authorizers to keep failing schools open, as well 
as clarify the roles and responsibilities between 
authorizers and the schools in their portfolios. 
Through analysis of recent policy changes in 
Ohio, it becomes clear why advocates for increasing 
regulation believe that Model II works better for 
charter school authorizers, operators, and their
students. The National Association of Charter School 
Authorizers recommended that states with many 
types of authorizers “make it clear there is room only 
for quality authorizing and quality charter schools” 
(NACSA, n.d.) because the impact of charter schools 
on student achievement varies throughout schools
(Gleason et al, 2010). Advocates of Model II support 
increasing regulation through strict and consistent
use of high standards, performance management 
tools, public reports on performance, and evaluations 
with clear consequences based on student 
performance outcome measures.
Ohio, once referred to as the “wild, wild, West” 
of charter schools, has enacted policy measures 
designed to protect communities from reckless 
authorization practices. The new directions in 
authorization could better the current outcomes
of Ohio students. These measures could increase 
the possibility of protecting students, families, and 
communities from the possible self-interests of 
charlatans posing as educational leaders. Recent
fndings by Ahn and McEachin (2017) show that while 
Ohio charter school students are closing some gaps 
in achievement, they are still less likely than their 
peers in traditional public schools to pass the state 
compulsory high school graduation test. House Bill 2 
serves to professionalize charter school authorization
and provide much-needed regulation and guidance
for the gatekeepers of Ohio’s charter sector. 
Concluding Discussion 
State departments of education, as well as other 
interested policy actors, must recognize and pursue 
their right to govern charter school authorizers. This 
pursuit should include identifying what works in
efective governance, and using that knowledge to
support student achievement. Accountability and
autonomy are essential in maintaining the original
objectives of the charter school movement: to 
liberate schools from bureaucratic oversight in order 
to allow for innovation. Advocates of high-quality 
education for all (including communities and parents) 
should recognize that increased regulations could
ensure that authorizers and charter school operators
equitably educate all children under their care. 
Literature, data, and evidence suggest that for
states seeking to increase high-quality educational 
opportunities, best practice would be to increase 
regulation and increase accountability for charter 
school authorizers. Attention to authorizer practice
must shift to the forefront of school governance 
policy. With Lipman’s (2011) understanding, it 
becomes apparent that closing charters results
in community instability and impoverishment
disproportionately impacting students of color.
Raising performance levels and keeping efective
schools open should increase stability for students
of color and positively impact their communities. 
In addition to replicating best practices when 
appropriate, and reducing the number of authorizers,
exemplary governance practices include promoting a
diverse portfolio of schools authorized by one entity 
and informing parent choice. In the following section, 
both are briefy discussed.
Promote diverse school portfolio systems 
The Center for Reinventing Public Education 
determined the portfolio strategy of school 
governance is a “citywide system of high-quality, 
diverse, autonomous public schools” (“Center for
Reinventing Public Education,” n.d.). The use of 
portfolios in cities such as Oakland, Los Angeles, 
and Cleveland, expands educational opportunities
through school choice, performance-based
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accountability, and pupil-based funding. While no 
claim is made here that the portfolio strategy in and 
of itself guarantees academic gains, what is known is 
that the portfolio strategy has yielded some academic 
gains in Cleveland charter schools. 
A 2014 Center for Research on Education 
Outcomes (CREDO) report noted, “Cleveland charter 
schools have signifcantly larger learning gains in both 
reading and mathematics. At the school level, 33% of 
the charter schools have signifcantly more positive 
learning gains than their TPS [traditional public 
schools] counterparts in reading and math” (p. 8). If 
the portfolio strategy continues to yield gains such as 
Cleveland’s, it has the potential to stand as a model of 
best practice in governing schools of choice serving 
students of color. The Cleveland Metropolitan School 
District authorizes or otherwise partners with almost 
twenty charter schools within its portfolio (Cleveland 
Metropolitan School District, n.d.). Authorization by 
school boards, as recommended by the NEA, allows 
local communities to invest in and support charter 
school operators as they work together to ofer
communities choice in schooling options. 
Informing parent choice 
Parents who choose to place their children in charter 
schools must be well informed with accurate data 
including measures of: student demographics, 
disaggregated achievement data, outcomes aligned 
to career and college readiness, graduation rates, SAT 
scores, college acceptance rates, and attendance at 
the very least. Otherwise, parents are playing Russian 
roulette while trusting authorizers to behave with the 
best interest of their children in mind. Sadly, many 
authorizers have become independently wealthy
serving their own interests at the expense of a quality 
education for children. In the best interest of children, 
parents need to have accurate data available when 
considering charter options. At the very least, parents
should know who the school authorizers are and their
rating, if the state rates them. They should also have 
access to review the authorizer’s history pertaining 
to their support for students of color including 
disaggregated academic outcomes. 
Given the uneven results charters yield in 
educational performance outcomes, it is imperative
to hold authorizers accountable for informing
parents and the public about academic performance 
as required for other public educators. Providing 
accurate and current information gives parents and 
caregivers the ability to make informed decisions 
about the best educational opportunities for their 
children. Doing so empowers communities of color to 
partner with authorizers who have evidenced success
in educating students of color, ensuring high-quality 
educational opportunities. 
Whether policy actors are for or against charter 
schools is becoming increasingly inconsequential.
Parents, many of whom are parents of children of 
color, are not only given the choice of charter schools 
as an alternative to traditional public education, but 
they are choosing them. The responsibility educators 
and policymakers must shoulder is to protect 
students, particularly vulnerable populations of
students. Needed is a requirement for charter school 
authorizers to disclose disaggregated achievement 
data in addition to college readiness, as earlier 
described. Policymakers must hold authorizers
accountable for the well-being of the children they 
serve by establishing policies that secure equity and 
excellence, and ensure conscientious implementation
of those policies. The responsibilities are particularly 
important for educating children of color, especially 
in communities routinely destabilized by substandard 
schooling.
Educational leaders are responsible for student
well-being in loco parentis. “Literally, in loco parentis
means ‘in place of the parent’” (Sperry, Daniel, 
Huefner, & Gee, 1998, p. 629). The most signifcant 
application of this concept is to the teacher-student 
or administrator-student relationship in K-12 settings
(Rumel, 2013). The doctrine comprises two major 
tenets: (a) to provide a safe environment for students
and (b) to protect students from foreseeable harm 
to both their physical and emotional well-being 
(Castaldo v. Stone, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1144 (D. 
Colo. 2001); Doe Parents No. 1 v. Dept. of Educ., 58 
P.3d 545, 585, 2002). Foreseeable harm for poorly 
educated children of color is predicated by the fact 
they “experience disadvantages, inferior outcomes
on almost every economically signifcant dimension 
including: earnings, education, housing, employment,
status in the criminal justice system, and health” 
(Banaji & Greenwald, 2013, pp. 314-315). Public 
school court cases have established precedents to 
safeguard students’ interests. As a result, many of 
the policies guiding information disclosure provide 
data and information, thereby granting parents and 
communities the opportunity and ability to monitor 
patterns of activity and inactivity and to evidence 
outcomes of efectiveness. 
Reimagining a vision for charter school regulation 
must now emerge in every state. Systemic change is 
complex. The layers of policy actors, from classroom 
teachers to state departments of education, both 
enrich and complicate the processes involved in 
implementing school choice policy. A tipping point 
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in policy creation for charter school authorizers 
is approaching. It is imperative for states to hold 
charter schools accountable and implement policies 
requiring careful scrutiny of authorizer governance.
Through improved regulation, accountability,
rigorous authorizer evaluation, and increased
transparency, states will then be able to ensure that 
students, families, and communities have high-quality
school choices. 
Endnotes 
1. All percentages were rounded to the nearest whole number. 
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